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Abstract—Hash chains provide a secure and light way of 
security to data authentication including two aspects: Data 
Integrity and Data Origin Authentication. The real challenge of 
using the hash chains is how it could recover the synchronization 
state and continue keeping the hash link in case of packet loss? 
Based on the packet loss tolerance and some accepted delay of 
video delivery which are representing the permitted tolerance for 
heavy loaded applications, we propose different mechanisms for 
such synchronization recovery. Each mechanism is suitable to use 
according to the video use case and the low capabilities of end 
devices. This paper proposes comparative results between them 
based on the status of each one and its overhead. Then, we 
propose a hybrid technique based Redundancy Code (RC). This 
hybrid algorithm is simulated and compared analytically against 
the other techniques (SHHC, TSP, MLHC and TSS).  Moreover, 
a global performance evaluation in terms of delay and overhead is 
conducted for all techniques. 
 
Index Terms—Video Streaming, Hash Chain, Robustness, 
Resynchronization, Redundancy Code  
I. INTRODUCTION  
HE transmission of multimedia applications over Internet 
occupies a wide band of research. The challenging points 
like security and reliability are representing the whole part of 
interest in applications like video streaming and IPTV delivery 
based security measures. Many security mechanisms were 
proposed for securing the delivery of real time applications 
based on Hash Chains methodology. Hash chains are very 
popular security mechanism for securing many applications 
such as authentication of multicast traffic [1, 8], routing of 
sensor networks and sensors applications [2], privacy of RFID 
authentication [3], data streaming [4], micropayment systems 
[5], one time password [6] and many data origin authentication 
applications. The main advantage of hash chains is the light 
calculations compared to other cryptographic algorithms like 
the encryption methods. It also provides a fast and secure way 
for the real time applications that are very sensitive to any 
delay caused by the security overhead. 
A. Video Streaming Security Measures 
According to the recommendations by National Institute of   
Standards and Technology (NIST) [16] for securing sensitive 
applications and also for defining the degree of security, there 
are four levels of security. These levels were organized based 
on group of roles define the co-relation between the operators 
and the provided services. That standard provides four 
increasing, qualitative levels of security: Level 1 (basic 
security measures), Level 2 (high physical layer security), 
Level 3 (Identity-Based security and more services 
authorization), and Level 4 (high level security applications). 
For video streaming, the objective is different because the 
security module or in general the cryptographic module must 
take into account the nature of this application (time sensitive 
application), and the quality of delivery affected by the 
security measures delay. So, we can build our prospection to 
secure video streaming on the degree of importance of this 
stream and also the capabilities of the low end devices that will 
be used by the clients to access this stream like PDA devices. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the security measures classification for our 
video streaming study. We divide the security modules into 
two levels according to the nature of video diffusion (online or 
offline video stream) and who diffused it (important speech or 
normal speech). We propose a suitable hashing technique for 
each level based on hash chains mechanism as shown in Fig. 1. 
Our solution adapts to different cases like when the stream 
has a big important but is not online. In this scenario, we will 
apply a cross layer security mechanism between the two levels 
shown in the figure. 
Therefore, the applied security measure for video streaming 
will not be fixed for all types of streams but it will vary 
according to the video requirements, the video status and the 
network conditions. 
We may combine hashing and watermarking so as to assure 
a high degree of security. These measures could be used and 
combined with our hash chain methodology according to the 
type of applications under security as follows: 
 
1. Digital Rights Management (DRM): is mainly 
designed to prevent illegal accessing, copying or 
converting of multimedia materials into other formats 
using digital devices. DRM is a generic term for access 
control technologies that used copyright protections. 
Signatures and watermarks are classes of DRM. 
2. Cryptographic Signature: used for authentication 
purposes like detection of any alteration of the signed 
data and to authenticate the data sender. 
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Fig. 1: video streaming security levels classification. 
 
3. Watermarks: are used for authentication in especial 
applications and are designed to resist alterations and 
modifications in data.   
4. Fragile Watermarks: are watermarks that have only 
very limited robustness. They are used to detect 
modifications of the watermarked data (like image 
applications).  
The ability to achieve good security for real time 
applications requires some security measures from the above 
items merged with the hashing mechanism. 
Using a hash function is a simple way to ensure data 
confidentiality. A hash function transforms a string of 
characters into a usually shorter, fixed-length value or key that 
represents the original string. The difference between hashing 
and encryption is in how the data is stored. With encrypted 
mode, the data can be decrypted with a key. With the hash 
functions, after the data is entered and converted using the 
hash function, the plaintext is gone. Therefore, the hashed 
values are only used in comparison. We have two base 
standards for hash building as follows: 
• SHA-1 [20]: When a message of any length < 2^64 bits is 
input, the SHA-1 produces a 160-bit (20 Bytes) output 
called a message digest. So, 2^160 operations are 
needed for knowing the digest value (the number of 
possibilities that can be generated with 160 bit length). 
• MD5 [19]: When a message of any length < 2^64 bits is 
input, the MD5 produces a 128-bit (16 Bytes) output 
called a message digest. So, 2^128 operations are 
needed for knowing the digest value (the number of 
possibilities that can be generated with 128 bit length). 
For simplicity, our work relies on using SHA-1 and 
comparing the overhead with MD5 as they used the same 
block-based calculations. But, the proposed algorithm could 
accommodate any type of new hashing like SHA-256 or SHA-
512. Although, there are a lot of critiques to MD5 like the 
trials to break it within max 1 hour proposed in [25], it is still 
implemented in many security applications. Also, the US 
declared that, it will gradually change to high series of SHA 
for the government applications. More collision resistance 
analysis about SHA family is listed in [26]. Actually, our 
objective is the reliability by finding solution to the hash links 
in hash chains technique. So, some details about attack 
mitigations will be shown in Section IV.  
Practically, we have two cases of video streaming as 
follows: 
Offline Video Streaming: The video is in this case on the 
server side and has a definite length.  So, the server could 
calculate any security measure for that total length before 
starting the client accessing it. YouTube and Dailymotion are 
good examples for this category of video sharing servers which 
have a huge database of short videos [13]. The Video-on-
Demand (VoD) is representing this case study.   
Online Video Streaming: This scenario is more complex. 
The length of video file in this case is unknown, so the sender 
can not calculate any measures of security when receiving 
from the up-loader or diffusion at different time periods. This 
scenario represents the personal TV or live video. It 
corresponds also to video streaming channels hosted by some 
Internet content providers.  
B. Related Work 
Hash chain is a successive application of a cryptographic 
hash function h(.) to any string. The link of chain means that; 
the initialization value currently input to h(.) will be the output 
of the previous hash calculated from the previous part of data. 
So, the hash calculations could not continue if the previous 
hash digest missed. 
Hash chains for video streaming have been considered 
extensively in the literature. The survey in [23] provides a 
good study about using hash chain in video streaming. It 
mainly conducted a comparison between many algorithms 
which proposed handling the issues of hash chain with video 
stream authentications. However, handling of the 
resynchronization problem for broken hash links still needs 
additional work. Our previous work [17] highlighted the 
resynchronization issue in hash chain links and categorized 
some solutions for it. Then, we added some security measures 
based on signing specific packets in the video stream [18]. The 
work in [9] gives a good starting point for how to sign a digital 
 
Video Streaming 
Security 
Classification and the Applied Security Measure  
Stream Level 1 
- Min security needs 
- Streams of normal clients on the Internet 
- Offline Uploading & Accessing of streams 
- Using multilevel hash chains 
- Video length is known before transmission 
Stream Level 2 
- Max security needs 
- Governmental videos (important speech) 
- Online channels diffusion  
- Using securing hash chains (keyed-based hash) 
- Video length is unknown before transmission 
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streaming video. Authors proposed two cases; offline and 
online streams. They chain blocks based on the packets inside 
the block. Each block carries the hash of the next one (online 
case). For the offline case they calculate the hash based on the 
whole video and the receiver must have some buffer so as to 
start the verification after a specific length of the video. Their 
algorithm does not handle the redundancy of chain links.  
In [10], authors introduce the Butterfly Graph. They divided 
the packets into groups and each group has one signature 
calculated based hashing. The redundancy is achieved by 
sending the signed packets several times. Their overall concern 
is to keep a good performance as the amount of redundancy is 
increased. Also, in [31,32] they examine the problem of 
streaming of authenticated video over lossy public networks 
depending on the ideas of Graph and taking into account the 
quality of wireless channels. It is a kind of optimization 
technique for authenticating the streaming packets which 
called Rate-distortion-Authentication (R-D-A). Moreover, they 
achieved remarkable optimization in media quality and packet 
overhead. 
In [11], the work is based on signing a small number of 
special packets in data stream; each packet is linked to a 
signed packet via multiple hash chain. The links depend on six 
hashes per packet. Hence six packets carry the same hash 
value and this represents a large overhead. Two solutions for 
securing the video stream are compared. The first solution is 
called TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant 
Authentication). The second scheme is called EMSS (Efficient 
Multichained Stream Signature).  
Another work [12], handled the video stream authentication 
by assuming a combination of one-way hashes and digital 
signatures to authenticate packets. Their idea can be explained 
as follows; for collision resistant, the hash of packet Pi is 
appended to packet Pi+1 before signing Pi+1, then the signature 
on Pi+1 guarantees the authenticity of Pi and Pi+1 at the same 
time. The drawback of that proposal is the large overhead as it 
increased linearly with the growth numbers of packets. 
A time-critical multicast authentication scheme was 
proposed in [27], which combines hash chains with one time 
signature to authenticate streaming of packets. The algorithm 
provides short end-to-end computational latency, perfect 
tolerance to packet loss, and strong resistance against 
malicious attacks. They used long key for achieving high 
security which leads to large overhead. 
 
C. Work Motivations and Organization   
Our objective in this paper is to study and design novel 
solutions for hash chain resynchronization in case of some 
packets loss. For conducting this study, we assume some 
parameters that will be repeated in many sections as shown in 
Table I in Section III. 
This work will completely focus on the handling 
mechanisms for the re-initialization problem to keep the 
continuous hash chain in case of packet loss. This loss can 
break the link of hash chains and may lead to restart the 
process again. We propose adding some redundancy codes that 
will be calculated based on the hash values of different Blocks 
from the video. Those redundancy values will be inserted in 
some packets inside the Block. Hence, those values will help 
the receiver side to extract the hash values for each Block 
without correctly received the whole packets of this Block. 
This means that, in case of some packets are lost from the 
Block, this loss will not affect on the continuity of hash chain 
used to authenticate the video transmission and also will not 
lead to stop the streaming.   
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Part II gives 
overview on the hash chain synchronization problem and the 
proposed solutions comparison. Part III illustrates our 
algorithm architecture and assumptions for achieving 
redundancy of hash link. Some attacks analyses are studied in 
Section IV. Section V shows the results and Section VI 
concludes our work and its future directions.   
II. HASH CHAINS RESYNCHRONIZATION  
Hash chain is an old technique used in many applications. 
Our work depends on a simple forward one way hashing 
system as shown in Fig. 2. This type of sequential hashing is 
often used in practice and requires relatively less memory than 
other types of parallel hashing. Moreover, it is more 
convincible for low capacity end devices. If we adopt the 
traditional hash chain in its typical way it will request a 
complex synchronization system. So, it will need large 
memory and buffering capacities from the clients. So, the 
adopting of forward and sequential way in hashing system will 
avoid these difficulties. Also, the buffering sizes will depend 
on our redundancy factors for how many Blocks/Window 
under processing as we will explain later in results section. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Simple construction of hash chain mechanism for processing one 
Block/Window 
IV0: is the standard Initialization Vector according to the type of hash 
algorithm  
IV1: is the final output from hashing Block 1 and will be the initialization 
vector of Block 2  
block: is representing standard unit for processing hash function (for example 
512 bits for MD5 or SHA-1 Modulo 512) 
Block: is representing a group of packets (for example one Block=100 
packets) 
 
When the hash chains are applied to the video streams like 
VoD or IPTV, it faces several problems for keeping the hash 
link continuity in case of packet drops. As some packets are 
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lost, this will cause mismatch calculation in hash link or 
Message Digest (MD) between sender and receiver. So, we are 
searching for continuity of hash chain in case of that loss 
happened.  
In the next sections we categorize the solutions for this 
problem into four categories (SHHS, TSP, MLHC and TSS). 
Then, we discuss the advantages and the disadvantages of each 
technique. Moreover, we suggest a new hybrid technique that 
collects the best features from the four methods of hash link 
synchronization.   
A. Self-Healing Hash Chain (SHHS) 
Self-Healing is a modern technique that is used a lot in the 
smart networks. It means that creating a process that has the 
ability to recover its state in case of system failures without 
external help. The technique was used  a lot with hash chain in 
many applications like ‘‘Self-Healing Key Distribution’’ [15] 
which focus on the users capability  to recover the lost group 
keys on their own, without requesting additional transmissions 
from the group manager. 
Video streaming can be delivered based on TCP or UDP 
transport protocols. TCP is mainly used to overcome Network 
Address Translation (NAT) filters but, the most appropriate is 
UDP. Usually, during online streaming, we have some packet 
drops that can be considered with respect to some packet loss 
tolerance. The acceptable tolerance may not affect the 
streaming quality. However, the loss could affect on 
synchronization of the hash chains of the stream.  
The Self-Healing Hash Chain (SHHC) can overcome this 
problem by re-synchronizing the chains despite the loss of 
some packets from the stream. The SHHC is a robustness 
system able to resolve the synchronisation problem of chains. 
As in the Fig. 3; the stream is divided into specific time blocks 
and at each time a hash must be calculated for this period of 
time. The reliability will depend on the redundancy factor of 
the concatenated hashes. To guarantee the synchronisation 
three hashes may be concatenated together.  
This procedure will add some redundancy for tracking the 
link synchronization points of the stream. Also, the advantage 
of this scheme is the low overhead for memory and 
calculations. 
 
Fig. 3: The time hash-chain of sending party 
 
As in the Fig. 3; the stream is divided into specific time 
Blocks and for each period of time a hash must be calculated. 
The sending parity will depend on some redundancy of the 
concatenated hash values that will be transmitted. We strongly 
recommend that three hashes must be concatenated so as to 
guarantee the synchronisation of links between sender and 
receiver. The concatenated values are inserted in the last 
packet of each Block of the video.  
The sequence for concatenation mode can be explained as 
follows: 
• Hash of time zero will be sign || h(t1), means the 
signed packet of the first part. 
• Hash of t1 time-end will be h(t1) || h(t2) 
• Hash of t2 time-end will be  h(t1) || h(t2) || h(t3) 
• Hash of t3 time-end will be  h(t2) || h(t3) || h(t4) 
• Hash of tn time-end of stream will be  h(tn-1) || h(tn) 
The pros of concatenations are: concatenating outputs from 
multiple hash functions provides collision resistance as good 
as the strongest of the algorithms included in the concatenated 
result. 
For less overhead, we can replace the concatenation process 
by XORing process. This replacement will reduce the 
overhead sent with in the stream by 1/3 for the base of 3-hash 
concatenated together. 
The self-healing feature comes from the receiver ability to 
extract or recalculate any hash without receiving the total 
Block or Window of packets. 
So, at any time the sender transmit three hashes to link the 
time Block of this time with the previous time Block and the 
coming one. This procedure will add some redundancy for 
tracking the synchronisation points of the stream. 
B. Time-Synchronization Point (TSP) 
This mechanism is used to assure synchronisation of hash 
chains in case of packet loss. It depends on adding additional 
information bits to the stream. The stream must be divided into 
a pre-defined specific time Blocks. After each Block, a 
synchronisation point must be inserted in the sender side as 
shown in Fig. 4. Those inserted points can help the receiver 
tracking the synchronisation of the stream. 
In this case the receiver must keep in tracking those time 
synchronisation points (TSP) so as not to lose the stream 
synchronisation or hash link breaks. The drawback of this 
technique is the large bits overhead added for synchronisation 
because it depends on adding an extra packet for this purpose. 
For more information about overhead comparison see Table II. 
 
 
Fig. 4: The time synchronisation point of sending party 
 
In this method, if we assume that each Block or Window has 
(N) packets, then the packet number (N+1) will be redundant 
packet. As, we insert this packet after each Block, it will add a 
global overhead on the stream depends on the total number of 
Blocks in the video file.  
Time 1 
t1 
Time 2 
t2 
Time 3 
t3 
Hash of time 1 
h(t1) 
T1) 
Hash of time 2 
h(t2) 
 
Hash of time 3 
h(t3) 
 
Block 1 
B1 
Block 2 
B2 
Block 3 
B3 
Hash of B1 
h(B1) 
Hash of B 2 
h(B2) 
Hash of B3 
h(B3) TSP1 TSP2 TSP3 
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C. Multi Layer Hash Chain (MLHC) 
This technique was used for some applications and gave 
good results for the problem of security assurance for the E-
lottery winners and their serial numbers generation tickets [7]. 
The multi layer means here to have calculations for hash 
chains where each calculation is representing one layer 
according to the base of calculation. Although the objectives 
are different (e-lottery and video streaming), this technique 
could be very effective especially in offline video streaming 
security mode. When we use this technique in video streaming 
the layers conception will completely be different so as to 
match the specific nature of the real time applications. We can 
highlight the impacts of two layers hash by the example in 
Fig. 5. In this structure, we have two concurrent layers of 
hashing as: 
 
1. H`i= h(Wi, IVst): unkeyed hashing step which 
depends on standard initialization vector 
2. Hi = h(H`i, IVsec): keyed hashing step where the key 
is equal the IVsec ( secure IV) 
 
And if the round function used is h(.), then: 
 
H`i=h(h(......h(h(IVst,W1),W2),........Wi-1),Wi) 
Hi=h(h(......h(h(IVsec,H`1),H`2),........H`i-1),H`i) 
 
This nested double layer hash chain can thwart many high 
level attacks to the stream and the hashing itself. 
 
  
Fig. 5: Two layer hash chain mechanism 
D. TimeStamp Synchronization (TSS) 
The sequence of packets could be used as a good 
measurement for achieving video synchronization and also 
keeping the link of hash chain. This can be efficient with less 
calculation cost and time overhead because the timestamp is a 
mandatory field in Real Time Protocol (RTP) packet as 
described in [14] for RTP packets of MPEG-4 streams. In this 
case, The RTP packets are responsible for sequence numbers 
and timestamp synchronisation (TSS) between the source and 
destination. The benefit of this technique is the reuse of 
parameters from RTP standard packets header. Therefore, the 
sequence number and timestamp for each packet are good 
indication or index to where is the lost point. So, the added 
digest value plus the original packet timestamp in all stream 
packets or in one packet per Block or Window of packets 
represent the link between sequential hash chain outputs. 
 
V=2|P|X|  CC   |M|     PT      |       sequence number 
Timestamp 
Synchronization source (SSRC) identifier 
contributing source (CSRC) identifiers 
.... 
MPEG-4 stream (byte aligned) 
...OPTIONAL RTP padding 
Fig. 6: RTP packet for MPEG-4 stream as in [14] 
 
Window time-stamp: the time stamp that will help in hash 
chain link synchronisation is 4 bytes per packet as shown in 
the Fig. 6. But, for our Window based of calculations, we will 
consider the 4 bytes only overhead per Window for achieving 
hash link synchronization which nothing added else the digest 
value according the cryptographic hash algorithm used. 
Therefore, if we have two parities under synchronization of 
timestamp, then the last packet of each Window or what is 
called the Window timestamp packet will responsible of hash 
link synchronization as the following: 
Let Ti is the timestamp of Window Wi, then the Window 
Digest will be: 
WDi = h(Wi,Hi-1) 
where Hi-1 is previous Window Digest Wi-1. But, we need to 
add the timestamp to this calculation by concatenating it to the 
previous Digest. So, the final Window hash will be:  
Hi = h( WDi || Ti , Hi-1) 
So, the hash chain links relations Hi+1, Hi, Hi-1 could be built 
based on the Windows timestamps Ti+1, Ti , Ti-1 . 
E. The Hybrid Technique Based (RC) 
Finally, we suggest a hybrid technique capable of inheriting 
the advantages of the previous solutions and also overcoming 
most of their drawbacks. This technique could be useful for 
slow processor endpoints so as to minimise the calculation 
needs to be performed during every session. Also, it could be 
used to rapidly re-establish the link synchronization in case of 
packet loss session problems or delay time. Another criterion 
is packet and hash information caching that have more CPU 
intensive compared with using time synchronization that may 
be important for low-memory mobile platforms.  
Our proposal is inspired from redundancy code techniques. 
Redundancy Code (RC) is a generic concept introducing 
some redundancy in the system to overcome hash chain break 
in case of packet loss and to increase the reliability of the 
security system. In the next Section, we introduce more details 
about using RC with hash chain. 
III. THE PROPOSED REDUNDANT HASH CHAIN METHOD 
Before describing the proposed architecture, we must have a 
look on the packetization sequence of the video stream. The 
high part of Fig. 7 illustrates the simple sequence in standard 
manner based on real time transport protocol [14]. The video 
is considered as a group of chunks output from the coder such 
as MPEG-TS [24]. This gives better clarification on which the 
stream word represents for us and what is the packet structure 
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for our proposal. The hashing calculations will be done after 
the first row of Fig. 7 (for transmitter) and before in the case of 
the receiver. 
The proposed architecture in Fig. 7 has many parameters 
that need to be initialized: 
Stream of Chunks: are the output blocks after MPEG-TS 
(like RTP packets). 
Blocks Bi: is a group of packets that have a relation with 
their numbered Chunks. For example; each Block=10 Packets 
and each Packet=7 Chunks in case of RTP Packet.  
IV0: is the initial victor for starting the hash chain. 
h(.): is the hash functions used for calculate the output hash 
like MD5 or SHA series. 
hi: is the output hash value or the output digest. 
Hi: is the output hash digest for two layer hash technique. 
Combination Code: is the coding process that will be used 
to calculate a redundancy code for generating the hash value in 
case of missing a hash value of Block (ex. XOR function).  
RCi: is the output Redundancy Code that is responsible for 
recalculate the missed hash value so as to keep the hash link 
not broken. It is something like Forward Error Correction 
(FEC) codes. 
The added Redundancy Code will allow the receiver to 
detect and correct the errors in the digest values (under some 
restrictions). This code is the key factor for solving the 
resynchronization problem of hash link. 
Hash link recovery could happen without asking the sender 
for additional data retransmission because the sender is 
memory-less in case of online video streaming. The 
advantages of RCs are that; buffering is not required and the 
retransmission of hash values can often be avoided (which 
reduces the bandwidth requirements, time calculations and the 
buffering memory). RC is therefore applied in this situation 
where the retransmissions are difficult to achieve in real time 
applications and memory-less devices. The main objective 
from RCs is the hash link synchronization and finding the 
recovery point of synchronization by obtaining the hash value 
of this time which represents the initial vector (IV) for next 
hash calculation in our chain. 
A. Assumptions  
All the previous proposals mentioned in section III 
differentiated between the concept of offline and online video 
streaming. They made their calculations based on the pre-
known video length in case of offline stream. Also, the online 
stream has an infinite length assumption. In both cases, if the 
receiver has some restrictions about the processing capabilities 
and the buffering capacities (Memory Buffers), the two cases 
lead to one case only which is the online scenario. 
Our proposed solution is built to fit the new generation of 
handheld devices that have some limitations in all processing 
capabilities compared to the normal PCs. So, the treatment of 
any video will be considered as an online one (from the 
receiver side) although if in some cases the sender knows all 
videos lengths accessed by the others. This assumption will 
eliminate the need of buffering of data at the receiver side 
before starting the playing of video in case of large videos.  
We assumed that, the redundancy in this case is mandatory 
for synchronization matter. But, when we calculate the RC for 
some part of data, this calculation will mainly depend on the 
degree of redundancy and the accepted overhead. 
For example, if RC calculated based on 3 hashes values like 
RC1= combination (H1, H2, H3) and RC2= combination (H3, 
H4, H5) then we have redundancy 3/4 with dynamic sliding 
Window. But, if we consider RC1= combination (H1, H2, H3) 
and RC2= combination (H4, H5, H6) then, it will represent the 
static sliding Window which means that no relation between 
the two Windows. If we take 4 hashes values the redundancy 
will be 4/5 and so on. So, which factor will be control the 
calculation of the RCs codes? This is one of the most effective 
factors in the calculations. 
 
In Table I, we assumed some parameters and values that we 
used in the calculation of hashing and RC values. All of the 
assumed parameters in the table were preselected based on the 
packet standardization size for Real Time Protocol (RTP). The 
calculated sizes for the Block and the Window are output 
result from the analytical and simulation results based Matlab.                                                                                                      
 
TABLE I 
PROPOSING PARAMETERS USED 
Parameters Symbol Definition 
Packet P Standard packet size like MTU size 
of 1500 Bytes 
block b Standard block size for hashing 
algorithm like 512 bits for MD5 or 
SHA-1 
Block B The number of packets to be 
processed together 
Packet Rate PR = VBR/MTU (packets per  sec) 
Block Rate BR = PR/ Block Size (Blocks per sec) 
Video Bit Rate VBR For example 512 Kbps or 1 Mbps 
Window W Is dynamic buffer contains number 
of Blocks 
Hash Function h(.) Is the hash algorithm used like 
MD5 or SHA-1 
Hash Output H Is the output digest or hash value 
of each Block 
Packet Error 
Rate 
PER Probability of packets loss or error 
in the Block 
Hash Error 
Rate 
HER HER = (PER/Block size).RF   this 
for any Window 
Redundancy 
Factor 
RF The number of Blocks per Window 
processing in scanning 
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Fig. 7: Block diagram for the hash chain redundancy for video streaming. The original stream is divided into chunks (series of packets) then assembled them 
to specific Blocks Bi after that the hash chain applied to the Blocks; finally, the RCs calculated based on static Window size. 
B. Sender Security Tasks 
This part focuses on how the sender prepares the packets 
and puts the calculated hash values and redundancy code in the 
packets? Also, how each packet will have an index to that 
place in the packet which caries this redundancy code? 
The Window mechanism adopts a technique of dynamic 
buffering. This buffer depends on some parameters like video 
rate and client processing capabilities. After an agreement 
done between the sender and receiver, the sliding Window 
mechanism will be conducted according to the redundancy 
factors adopted.  
The complete steps for the implemented algorithm are: 
1. Input video file. 
2. Divide the file into chunks by MPEG-TS coder each 
(188 Bytes). 
3. Define the Packet size (each packet 7 chunks). 
4. Define the Block size (variable from 10 to 100). 
5. Define the used hash function MD5 or SHA-1. 
6. Start hashing Block by Block with initialization vector 
of current Block is the hash value of previous Block 
(chain mechanism). 
7. Calculate the Redundancy Code (XOR two or 3 hash 
together). 
8. Insert the RC code in specific packet (or more than 
one). 
9. Index each packet with the location of RC place [17]. 
10. Add transport headers and send the packets of Block 
according to the Window size. 
C.  Receiver Verification Tasks 
All treatments of the received packets are after RTP layer. 
The receiver will handle the verification of Blocks or Windows 
according to the Window size which controlled by the 
Redundancy Factor (RF). Therefore, it can process one Block 
and compare its hash digest with the received one. If they are 
identical, this means that the received Block is correct and it 
will process the next. Otherwise, it will wait till the Window 
complete its size and then use the RC value to drive the hash 
of the previous Block to help the receiver continuing its 
verifications for the next Block. 
The total procedure for verification is as follows: 
1. Read the received RTP packets. 
2. group the Block size (ex. from 10 to 100 packets) 
3. verify the whole Block secured hash and the index for 
each packet 
4. compare the receive hash with the calculated one 
5. drop the packets that not have the correct index 
6. use the redundancy code RC in case of packet loss to 
know the hash value or the signature of that Block 
7. divide  the packets to chunks for MPEG decoder 
8. decode the packet elements of the video 
9. run the application to view the video in case of ( OK) 
for the predefined tolerance for packet loss 
10. return verification pass (OK) 
D. The Recovery Time  
The recovery time is the receiver waiting time before 
recovering the missed hash link based on the RC value. This 
time must be less than the standard RTT value. 
We have two scenarios for recovery: 
Best Case: delay time for recovery is very small in comparing 
to Round Trip Time (RTT) to avoid requesting new IV for 
reinitialization process. 
Worst Case: delay time will be larger than the best case 
because the loss happened in the beginning of the Window and 
the receiver will wait some times till receive the entire 
Window. But, in this case almost the delay will be less than 
RTT or the receiver will prefer reinitializing than recovering. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: processing of static Window sliding over N Blocks 
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If we define the Recovery Time as the waiting time for the 
receiver to recover the hash link in case off any Block error. 
As shown in Fig. 8, any Window consists of (N) Blocks and 
the Block Rate is BR Block/sec as shown in Table I. So we 
can calculate the waiting time as: 
Waiting Time: WT = (N-i)/BR where (i) is the error Block 
position in the Window 
For the best case: (i = N), the error occurred in the last Block 
of the Window (ideal scenario for recovery) 
 
WTb = (N-i)/BR = N-N/BR= Zero 
 
For the worst case: (i=1), the error occurred in the first Block 
 
WTw = (N-i)/BR = (N-1)/BR 
 
In all cases the WTb or WTw must be less than the RTT value 
so as to prove that; it is best for the receiver to depend on RC 
value for recovering any missed hash link rather than 
requesting reinitialization IV from the sender. 
E. Offline Access Initialization 
As in the Fig. 9 below, we have two phases: the uploader-
server phase and the client-server access phase. We assume 
that; the first phase is pre-secured by the server side. 
Moreover, this phase can be secured more and more using 
encryption techniques especially in this offline scenario as the 
online real time feature not exist. 
 
 
Fig.9: offline joining case 
 
Client joins procedure  
When a user wants to join the media streaming server, 
he/she should first pass the authentication phase in the secured 
manner as it explained in [18]. Then, it will be assigned 
directly to the first Window number and starting the indexing 
from zero (IV0) because there is no need for its timestamp as 
the access is offline and must start from the beginning of the 
video. 
F. Online access initialization 
At any time, an uploader can start his online video diffusion 
and any user can access this stream from the hosting server at 
the time instant of his joining. The server initializes the IV0 for 
this client by IVt where t is current time of the server side. 
 
 
Fig. 10: online case with different joining time access for clients 
 
In Fig. 10, client 1 joined the online stream at time t2 which 
means that; he missed 2 Windows from the beginning of the 
stream and client 2 joined at t3 which means he missed 3 
Windows from the starting time of diffusion. 
Client joins procedure  
When a user wants to join the media streaming server, 
he/she should first pass the authentication phase in the secured 
manner explained in [18]. Then, it can find the trusted starting 
point according to its time-stamp for assigning to the nearest 
Window index number [17]. 
G. Security Exchange Phase 
This phase focuses on the key agreement between the server 
and clients. Also, its objective is to generate either a secure 
(IV) to be used in hash chain or a secure private key that will 
use to sign the hash value. There are many security algorithms 
that can handle this process like Diffie-Hellman (DH) [28] or 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [29]. Fig.11 illustrates all 
the steps needed in this phase. We use an elliptic curve key 
agreement based on Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) [30]. 
As each user has a YouTube email address (for example: 
bob@gmail.com), we will use it to generate a public key. This 
will lead to a personalized key agreement to access to 
YouTube services. 
Client Server      PKG
E(p,A,B), P, X X = Sx.P
Y = Sy.P YZ = Sy.X = Sy.Sx.P
Z = Sx.Y = Sx.Sy.P
Z(zx,zy) shared
Ks = zx chosed
Z(zx,zy) shared
Ks = zx chosed
SSL
E(p,A,B): y2 = x3 + Ax + B mod p
P, X, Y, Z are points in E(p,A,B)
Sx is the server’s private key
Sy is the client’s private key
Ks is 128 bits shared key
(Kpriv, IV)Ks PKG generates secure IV and Kpriv using client 
youtube address
 
Fig.11: Security exchange phase 
In this phase, there are two important steps. The first one is 
the key agreement to generate a shared key (Ks) and the 
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second one is the generation of client private key Kpriv by the 
Private Key Generator (PKG). The two steps need to be 
realized in a secure manner. 
After the login access, an SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) 
session starts. The server chooses an elliptic curve defined in 
Galois Field GF(p) where p is a 128 bits prime number. This 
elliptic curve has A and B like coefficient. It will be defined as 
E(p,A,B): y2 = x3 + Ax+ B mod p. The server chooses a public 
point P in E and computes the public point X = Sx.P where Sx 
is the server private key. E(p,A,B), P and X are sent to the 
client as shown in Fig.11. 
This latter calculates a point Y = Sy.P where Sy is his private 
key and, then, sends Y to the server. 
The server and the client calculate the point Z = Sx.Y = Sy.X 
= Sx.Sy.P. Z has the form of Z(zx,zy) where zx is the abscissa 
and zy is the ordinate. The shared key Ks can be zx or zy with a 
128 bits length. 
After this step, the PKG will generate the client private key 
Kpriv using his security parameters and the client YouTube 
address (as a unique identity). The public PKG security 
parameters are: E(p,A,B), p and Ppub = s.P where s is the PKG 
private key. There is also a hash function called MapToPoint 
MTP which convert a simple string into a point in E(p,A,B). 
Then, the client’s public key is MTP (client YouTube address) 
and Kpriv = s.MTP(client YouTube address).  
The server sends the Kpriv and the Initialisation Vector (IV) 
encrypted with the shared key Ks.  
Now, each client has a secure IV to start his scenario of 
accessing the server as shown in Fig. 9 or Fig. 10. 
IV. ATTACKS ANALYSIS 
As our hashing technique uses keyed-hash functions, the 
majority of attacks can be thwarted. This part gives an 
overview on some high level attacks that can affect on the 
hashing or the link of chain. Those attacks may help in broking 
the hash link and causing some missing of video 
synchronization. 
• Replay attack: (the attacks produced by delaying or 
deleting some video packets and resend them or anther 
to the destination along the same path). The time-stamp 
property can eliminate this attack. The Window 
transmission timestamp can resolve this problem by 
checking in the receiving side.  
• Padding attack: (the attacks generated from adding 
some bytes to the original data and recalculate and 
resend the hash of new padded data). This attack can be 
easily eliminated by pre-pending the Window Size or 
Length because it is impossible to pre-pending the 
whole video length in case of online case but it is 
possible in offline streaming.  
• Packet loss problems: The UDP transmissions are 
unreliable and cause some packet loss and others come 
within different order. The indexing mechanism of the 
Window algorithm can overcome on this problem. 
• Collision attacks: this attack relevant to the hash 
algorithm used. MD5 and SHA-1 suffer from this attack 
which includes two aspects (Preimage and Birthday 
attacks). But, our hash construction can overcome these 
attacks as the following: 
o For Preimage attack: the RC calculation based 
concatenated 2, 3 or 4 Digest values gives 
impossibility to this attack. The concatenation gives 
some strongest to the final hash value. More over, 
the secure IV used will add some complexity to 
cryptanalysis attackers’ procedures.   
o For birthday attack: the Multilayer construction 
increases the complexity of finding two messages 
having same Digest value. 
Moreover, the hashing structure plays an important role in 
the degree of security. For using keyed-hash over unkeyed-
hash have the following pros: 
Keyed hash mechanism proposed in [21, 22] which called 
HMAC is a good example for Keyed-Hashing for Message 
Authentication Codes based on MD5 or SHA-1. It depends on 
secure shared key used with any standard cryptographic hash 
function between two parities to add some security measure for 
the message integrity and source-destination authentications. 
The degree of security could be increased if we used secure 
initialization vectors for hashing the windows of video stream. 
This IV can be created and defined by the same manner 
explained in [18] based on PKG private key generation system 
with the elliptic curve secured manner. Therefore, the value 
added to cryptographic hash functions by the keying system 
used can overcome many weakness and some attacks related to 
normal hashing or what is called unkeyed hash. 
V. RESULTS 
In general, we built our analytical and simulation results 
based on the assumed parameters and values in Table I. 
Moreover, these assumptions were assumed based on some 
standards like packet size equal MTU and the delay times for 
video streaming within 1 to 2 sec maximum. But, it is 
important again to re-mention the difference in structure 
between Packet, bock, Block and Window as the following:   
• packet: is the standard packet size 1500 Bytes 
• block: is the standard size of block used by hash 
algorithm which is 512 bits for MD5 or SHA-1 
• Block: is the number of packets to be processed 
together 
• Window: is the total buffer which consists of number 
of Blocks depending on some parameters like: video 
rate, processing delay and RTT value 
 
The Round Trip Time (RTT) is delay time consumed by the 
client to join the streaming server. It is important for our 
proposed algorithm to have total Delay time based on RC 
calculations and buffering or de-jittering less than the RTT or 
the client will prefer to initiate the session by requesting 
initialization vector. In this case the total Delay may be greater 
than RTT. The following equation expresses the total Delay 
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related to buffering based static Window calculations: 
Dbuffer = Ddejitter + Dcalcul 
We have simulated the Redundancy Code Synchronization 
Recovery State (RC-SRS) algorithm and analyse some 
preliminary results. The obtained results based on some videos 
assumptions. Assume that, we have video file that needs buffer 
size (Bs) equal 2Mbit, then (Bs=2Mbits) and transmitting rate 
(R=1Mbit/Sec) then the total delay = (Bs/R) = 2 sec. So, if we 
have two delay times as the following: 
Dcalcul : processing time for calculate hash (sender) and 
verification (receiver). 
Dwait : total delay time  before starting using the RC to 
recalculate the hash link of any Block inside the Window 
according to the Block order in the Window (Best or Worst 
case as explained in Section III-D). 
Then Dcalcul+Dwait must be less than (Bs/R) which 2 sec. So, 
our threshold condition will be: 
(Dcalcul + Dwait)< 2 sec 
Dwait=(No packets x PS Packet Size)/ R (bits/sec) 
We will put the two sec in this case as Max threshold 
allowed delay time and change the number of packets to find 
the max number of Block size or buffer under the above 
conditions.  
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Fig. 12: The optimal number of packets under maximum allowable delay time 
(1 to 2 sec) 
 
Fig. 12 shows the relation between the numbers of 
packets/Window or Block versus our assuming delay time 
from 1 to 2 sec. The curve gives 85 packets as optimum 
number for Window or Block size. 
Fig. 12 compares the total overhead (the added bytes to 
stream as a redundancy code) by using MD5 or SHA-1 hash 
algorithms. As shown, if we assume the number of packets per 
block equal 10, so the full redundancy means sending the RC 
10-times (means with each packet). But, this will lead to very 
high overhead. 
If we take an example; for MPEG-TS the output chunks are 
equal 188 Bytes/chunk. The RTP packet size as we captured 
from the packet analyzer during the simulation was 1370 Bytes 
which equal 7(chunks) x188 Bytes + 54 (total headers rest). 
So, on the base of 1500 Bytes standard packets we still have 
1500-(1370+2 bytes for index to the place of RC) = 128 Bytes. 
Those 128 Bytes give us the probability of sending the RC 8 
times in case of MD5 and 6 times in case of SHA-1 as shown 
in Fig. 13. Those results were obtained under our assumptions 
of packet size 1500 Bytes and Block size 85 packets. 
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Fig. 13: The overhead bytes in terms of number of redundancy trials 
 
In Fig. 14, a comparison between different methods has 
been made in terms of processing time for each Block of video 
against different video rates. This Block is almost is almost 2 
sec in case of SHHC technique and 85 packets (for each 
packet size 1500 Bytes) in case of TSP, MLHC, TSP and RC 
techniques. The results indicate minimum accepted calculation 
time for our proposal based RC which the average time about 
200 msec for each Block.  
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Fig. 14: The computation time comparison between the different methods 
against different videos bit rates. 
 
For the error rate and its impact on hash recovering or 
reliability of our technique we have two parameters control 
this process: 
Packet Error Rate (PER): is the probability of an error 
occurred in any packet of the Block. So, 
 
PER=1/Block size 
If the Window has (M) Blocks then the total will be: 
 
PERT=(1/Block size)/M 
Hash Error Rate (HER): is the probability of an error occurred 
exactly in the packet which carried the RC: 
 
HER= PERT/Block size 
This calculation is valid for the case of each Window contains 
one Block. But, if we have different Redundancy Factors (RF) 
like 2/3, 3/4 and 4/5 then, we must multiply the HER by the 
RF as: 
HER= (PERT/Block size).RF 
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TABLE II 
OVERHEAD COMPARISON 
Resynchronization 
Technique The Method Used 
MD5 
16-Bytes /window 
SHA-1 
20-Bytes/window 
Overhead 
processing 
Delay 
SHHC -Hashes Concatenation (3 hashes) 
  -Hashes XOR 
48-Bytes/window 
16-Bytes/window 
60-Bytes/window 
20-Bytes/window 3.X 
TSP One packet/window N-Bytes N-Bytes X 
MLHC 2 Layers hash 16-Bytes 20-Bytes ≈2.X 
TSS 4 Bytes/packet for timestamp  20-Bytes 24-Bytes X 
RC-SRS 
-Redundancy 2/3 
-Redundancy 3/4 
-Redundancy 4/5 
16-Bytes 
16-Bytes 
16-Bytes 
20-Bytes 
20-Bytes 
20-Bytes 
2.X 
3.X 
4.X 
In this comparison N is the packet size and X is the processing time for each Block/Window buffers and X<<RTT. 
 
In Fig. 15, the performance of the hybrid technique based 
RC in terms of probability of recovery against different packet 
loss error rates has been illustrated. The simulation has been 
done using SHA-1 hashing technique. The three redundancy 
factors used are 2/3, 3/4 and 4/5 (which means combines 2 
hashes, 3 hashes or 4 hashes values per static Window) give 
high probability of chain recovery till error rate 0.2 % for all 
RF. This gives us good indication for the robustness of our 
proposal and its high degree of recovery stat of chain link. 
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Fig. 15: The percentage of recovery state against the packet error rate PER for 
video rate 1024 kbps with different redundancy factors 2/3, 3/4 and 4/5. 
 
Table II summarizes the behaviour of each algorithm by 
comparing between them in terms of overhead and processing 
delay per each Window or Block. The overhead for the hybrid 
technique based RC is almost the same overhead of the others 
or less than them. Also, the max delay time is 4.X is less than 
RTT value for the clients. 
A. Advantages of Small Window or Block Size 
As the Window size is varied based on the video rate, the 
achieving degree of reliability has some how relation with the 
increasing of Window size. It is best to keep the Window as 
small as possible so as to enhance the reliability of 
transmission. This is very important in transmission over UDP 
because its nature is unreliable by default. But, for TCP as it is 
reliable transmission so, the impact of Window increasing will 
not have great effects on the reliability.  
Although many previous works simulated the large number 
of packets per Block, our work has good benefits from 
adopting small Window buffers like: 
1. more reliable with unreliable transmission 
environment like UDP transport systems 
2. fast calculation and verification time 
3. small overheads 
4. the Block with 85 packets seems a small size, but this 
assumption has a good features on PER or losses till 
complete Window 
5. the HER will be controllable under these assumptions 
B. Adaptive Window Size 
This work adopts static sliding Window which means that; 
each Window consists of fixed number of Blocks. The 
Window size is negotiated between the server and client 
according to the video rate and the client capabilities during 
the session establishment. The client will process the Window 
for specific number of Blocks then empty it. So, there is no 
relation between the current Window and the next one else the 
hash value of the last Block of this Window. So, the receiver 
only cashes small information from the previous window 
which is its digest value to use it as initialization vector for the 
next one.  
  
Fig. 16: window size for different video rates against video rates (64K, 128K, 
256K, 512K, 768K and 1M) 
 
As we agree before from Fig. 12 that we build our 
comparison on Window or Block size 85 packets for video bit 
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rate 1024 Kbps and for a delay time 1 sec, this buffer will be 
duplicated if we assume 2 sec delay as shown in Fig. 16. In 
this figure, there is a comparison between different video bit 
rates against the elevation effects of Window size. As the rate 
increased the window size must be increased and vice verse. 
But, decreasing the video rate below 512 Kbps will lead us to 
Window size less than 85 packets which by default has 
negative impact on the delay time augmentation. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION  
This work focused on the resynchronization needs for hash 
chain mechanisms in video security by using redundancy codes 
(RCs). Therefore, we categorized the methods that can be used 
in hash chain link recovery into four (SHHC, TSP, MLHC and 
TSP). Then, we proposed a hybrid technique called RC-SRS 
that inherits from the pros of all previous techniques. 
In terms of complexity, a comparison has been made 
between the different ways for achieving the resynchronization 
of hash chain. This is followed by an evaluation of our 
proposed method RC-SRS for resynchronisation based on 
redundancy codes and a study on attack mitigations. Our 
results indicted that; the RCs will not cause additional 
computation time for the sender and receivers and the 
overhead added is accepted in terms of packet size. Moreover, 
the delay time consumed by the receiver to deduce the hash 
link based on received RC is less than standard RTT. 
As, this work adopted static sliding Window technique for 
calculating the RCs, our prospection is to simulate the dynamic 
case. This scenario will be built using dynamic sliding 
Window. We expect that this scenario will add more 
robustness besides increasing the degree of reliability and the 
degree of recovery.  
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